Archiv der Kategorie: Bezugnahme auf drohende Abschiebung von Ungarn nach Serbien

EGMR / Az.: 47287/15 / Ungarn


49. The Government were of the view that since the applicants had been free to leave the territory of the transit zone in the direction of Serbia, they in fact had not been deprived of their personal liberty. Article 5 of the Convention was therefore inapplicable.

52. It must be determined in the first place whether the placing of the applicants in the transit zone constituted a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. The Court has already found that holding aliens in an international zone involves a restriction upon liberty which is not in every respect comparable to that obtained in detention centres. However, such confinement is acceptable only if it is accompanied by safeguards for the persons concerned and is not prolonged excessively. Otherwise, a mere restriction on liberty is turned into a deprivation of liberty (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 43, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996-III, and Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787/03 and 29810/03, § 68, 24 January 2008).

68. The motives underlying the applicants’ detention may well be those referred to by the Government in the context of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention, that is to counter abuses of the asylum procedure. However, for the Court the fact remains that the applicants were deprived of their liberty without any formal decision of the authorities and solely by virtue of an elastically interpreted general provision of the law – a procedure which in the Court’s view falls short of the requirements enounced in the Court’s case-law. The conditions of Article 31/A of the Asylum Act were not met and no formal decision was taken; furthermore no special grounds for detention in the transit zone were provided for in Article 71/A. In this connection the Court would reiterate that it has considered the absence of any grounds given by the judicial authorities in their decisions authorising detention for a prolonged period of time, as in the present case to be incompatible with the principle of the protection from arbitrariness enshrined in Article 5 § 1 (see Stašaitis v. Lithuania, no. 47679/99, § 67, 21 March 2002; Nakhmanovich v. Russia, no. 55669/00, § 70, 2 March 2006; Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967/01, § 91, 1 March 2007, and
Mooren v. Germany [GC], no 11364/03, § 79, 9 July 2009).

69. It follows that the applicants’ detention cannot be considered “lawful” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Consequently, there has been a violation of that provision.

75. The Court observes that the applicants’ detention consisted in a de facto measure, not supported by any decision specifically addressing the issue of deprivation of liberty (see paragraph 67 above). Moreover, the proceedings suggested by the Government concerned the applicants’ asylum applications rather than the question of personal liberty. In these circumstances, it is quite inconceivable how the applicants could have pursued any judicial review of their committal to, and detention in, the transit zone – which itself had not been ordered in any formal proceedings or taken the shape of a decision.

76. The Court therefore must conclude that the applicants did not have at their disposal any “proceedings by which the lawfulness of [their] detention [could have been] decided speedily by a court”.

77. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

89. In view of the satisfactory material conditions and the relatively short time involved, the Court concludes that the treatment complained of did not reach the minimum level of severity necessary to constitute inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.

90. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it finds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

100. The Court further observes that the Government have not indicated any remedies by which the applicants could have complained about the conditions in which they were held in the transit zone.

101. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the Convention.

118. The Court observes that the applicants were removed from Hungary on the strength of the Government Decree listing Serbia as a safe third country and establishing a presumption in this respect. The individualised assessment of their situation with regard to any risk they ran if returned to Serbia took place in these legal circumstances. Indeed, it involved a reversal of the burden of proof to the applicants’ detriment including the burden to prove the real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment in a chain-refoulement situation to Serbia and then the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, eventually driving them to Greece. However, it is incumbent on the domestic authorities to carry out an assessment of that risk of their own motion when information about such a risk is ascertainable from a wide number of sources. Not only that the Hungarian authorities did not perform this assessment in the determination of the individual risks but they refused even to consider the merits of the information provided by the counsel, limiting their argument to the position of the Government Decree 191/2015.

125. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that the applicants did not have the benefit of effective guarantees which would have protected them from exposure to a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of that provision in this regard.

Stellungnahme des HHC: Hungary – Government’s New Asylum Bill on Collective Push-backs and Automatic Detention


The most concerning changes include:

  • The grounds on which the Government may order a ‘state of crisis due to mass migration’ are extended to include vaguely defined requirements [Bill, Article 6].
  • The Government plans to extend the existing state of crisis by a further 6 months, it has announced, until 7 September 2017.
  • If any foreigner who has no right to stay in Hungary is apprehended anywhere in the country, s/he shall be “escorted” back by the police to the external side of the border fence along the southern border. Migrants affected by this push-back measure will not be given access to seek asylum or to challenge their removal from the country, an action that makes the otherwise prohibited collective expulsion the norm, and breaches the EU Returns Directive. No registration or individual documentation of persons “escorted” back across the fence is carried out, neither are their protection needs assessed [Bill, Article 7].
  • Asylum applications can only be submitted in person within the transit zones [Bill, Article 7]. This proposal is especially problematic and worrying as since 23 January 2017 the number of admitted asylum seekers to each of the now operational two transit zones along the Serbian border has been reduced to 5-5 persons per working day.
  • All those who are accomodated at open reception facilities or detained in asylum or immigration detention facilities at the time the bill enters into force will be transferred to the transit zones [Bill, Articles 3, 4 and 9].
  • All asylum-seekers, including all vulnerable persons and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children over 14 years of age, will be detained in the transit zones [Bill, Articles 4, 7 and 9]. The detention of unaccompanied minor children between the age of 14-18 years is clearly against the best interest of the child and breaches human rights and EU law.
  • The placement of asylum-seekers in the transit zones is “effectively detention”, as even the Government admits it in the reasoning of the Bill [General reasoning, para. 4]. However, no detention order would be issued and consequently no legal remedy would be available against the detention. The current maximum 28 days of stay in the transit zone would be eliminated, rendering the de facto detention of asylum seekers indefinite [Bill, Article 12].
  • The deadline to seek judicial review of inadmissibility decisions and rejections of asylum applications would be drastically shortened to 3 days, hindering the applicant’s ability to challenge these decisions in court [Bill, Article 7].
  • Judicial clerks, who are not appointed fully qualified judges, would also be involved in making court decisions in the asylum procedure [Bill, Article 6].
  • Personal interviews in the judicial review of asylum decisions could be carried out remotely via telecommunication devices [Bill, Article 6].
  • Asylum seekers in the transit zones would be obliged to cover the costs of their detention unless they are granted protection status [Bill, Article 3].

Neuer AIDA-Bericht zu Ungarn


Zusammenfassung des Berichts:

In the O.M. v. Hungary judgment of 5 October 2016, the ECtHR found that detention was not assessed in a sufficiently individ ualised manner and that the authorities did not exercise particular care in order to avoid situations facing an asylum seeker on account of his sexual orientation, which risked reproducing the plight that forced him to flee. Further on, detention for the purpose of establishing the asylum seeker’s identity does not  fall under the scope of Article 5(1)(b) of ECHR, when asylum seeker makes reasonable efforts to clear his/her identity, because there is no legal  obligation for asylum seekers in Hungary to provide documentary evidence of their identity.

Integration support: As a result of legislative changes in April and June 2016, all forms of integration support were eliminated. Since the entry  into effect of Decrees 113/2016 and 62/2016 and the June 2016 amendment to the Asylum Act, beneficiaries of international protection are no longer  eligible to any state support such as housing support, additional assistance and others.

There is no specific code of conduct for interpreters in the context of asylum procedures. Many interpreters are not professionally trained on asylum issues. There is no quality assessment performed on their work, nor are there
any requirements in order to become an interpreter for
the IAO. The IAO is obliged to select the cheapest interpret from the list, even though his quality would not be the best.
For example, in the Vámosszabadi refugee camp, the HHC lawyer reported that in all his cases regarding Nigerian clients, none of the English interpreters understood fully what the clients said; the lawyer had to help the interpreter. The same happened at the court. There was another case, where the interpreter did not speak English well enough to be able to translate; for example, he did not know the word
„asylum“. In another case before the Budapest court, the interpreter was from Djibouti, and the client from Somalia did not understand her. The interpreter said the client was lying and the judge decided that there would be no interview.
In another case the client claimed that he converted to Christianity and the interpreter was Muslim. He did not know the expressions needed for the interview, not even in Farsi,
not to mention Hungarian; for example: disciples, Easter, Christmas and so on. The lawyer had to help him.
A decision must be communicated orally to the person seeking asylum in his or her mother tongue or in another language he or she understands. Together with this oral communication, the decision shall alsobe made available to the applicant in writing, but only in Hungarian. The HHC’s attorneys working at the transit zones and Kiskunhalas observe that most of decisions are not translated to the clients by interpreters. Instead the IAO uses case officers or even other clients to announce the main points of the decision. The justification for a decision reached is never explained to the asylum seeker.

The following situations are applicable to Dublin returnees:
(a) Persons who had not previously applied in Hungary and persons whose applications are still pending are both treated as first-time asylum applicants.
(b) For persons whose applications are considered to have been tacitly withdrawn (i.e. they left Hungary and moved on to another EU Member State) and the asylum procedure had been terminated, the asylum procedure may be continued if the person requests such a continuation within 9 months of the withdrawal of the original application. Where that time-limit has expired, the person is considered to be a subsequent applicant (see section on Subsequent Applications). However, imposing a deadline in order for the procedure to be continued is contrary to the Dublin III Regulation, as the second paragraph of Article 18(2) states that when the Member State responsible had discontinued the examination of an application following its withdrawal by the applicant before a decision on the substance has been taken at first instance, that Member State shall ensure that the applicant is entitled to request that the examination of his or her application be completed or to lodge a new application for international protection, which shall not be treated as a subsequent application as provided for in the recast Asylum Procedures Directive. This is also recalled in Article 28(3) of the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive, which explicitly provides that the aforementioned 9-month rule on withdrawn applications “shall be without prejudice to [the Dublin III Regulation].”
(c) Persons who withdraw their application in writing cannot request the continuation of their asylum procedure upon  return to  Hungary; therefore they will have to submit a subsequent application and present new facts or circumstances (see section on Subsequent Applications). This is also
not in line with above-described second paragraph of Article 18(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, which should be applied also in cases of explicit  withdrawal in writing and not only in cases of tacit  withdrawal. This is problematic in the view of recent practices in Hungary when detained asylum seekers withdraw their applications in order to be released from asylum detention. By imposing detention on asylum seekers returned under the Dublin  III  Regulation, in practice the IAO promotes the option of withdrawal amongst them. This practice can be interpreted as a disciplinary use of detention against those who lodge an asylum claim in Hungary.
(d) The asylum procedure would also not continue, when the returned foreigner had previously received a negative decision and did not seek judicial review. This is problematic when the IAO issued a decision in someone’s absence. The asylum  seeker who is later returned under the Dublin procedure to Hungary will have to submit a subsequent application and present new facts and evidence in support of the application (see section on Subsequent  Applications). According to Article 18(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, the responsible Member State that takes back the applicant whose applicat
ion has been rejected only at the first instance shall ensure that the applicant has or has had the opportunity to seek an effective remedy against  the rejection. According to the IAO, the applicant only has a right to request a judicial review in case the decision has not yet become legally binding. Since a decision rejecting the application becomes binding once the deadline for seeking judicial review has passed without such a request  being submitted, the HHC believes that the Hungarian practice is in breach of the Dublin III Regulation because in such cases Dublin returnee applicants are not afforded an opportunity to seek judicial review after their return to Hungary.
Especially problematic will be the case of returned asylum seekers who have crossed Serbia before arriving in Hungary. In case they will have to submit a subsequent application, their application will be likely declared inadmissible based on an application of the “safe third country” notion, without the possibility for these persons to be heard beforehand. Since  there is no effective remedy against the unlawful decision of the IAO, such transfers to Hungary are exposing applicants to a real risk of chain deportation  to  Serbia, which may trigger a practice of indirect refoulement.

Since the enactment of legislative amendments to the Asylum Act in 2015 and ensuing practice, administrative authorities and courts in at least 15 countries have ruled against Dublin transfers to Hungary. At least 6 countries (Czech  Republic, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, United Kingdom) have suspended transfers to Hungary as a matter of policy.

The fact is that since 15 September 2015, Serbia is not taking back third-country nationals under the readmission agreement except for those who hold valid travel/identity documents and are exempted from Serbian visa requirements. Therefore actual returns to Serbia are not possible. Between January and November 2016, only 182 irregular migrants were officially returned to Serbia. Neither the refusal of the asylum applications in the transit zones, nor the “legalised” push-backs since 5 July 2016 result in such official readmissions. Among the readmitted persons, there were 84 Serbian, 35 Kosovar and 27 Albanian citizens. None of the returnees were Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi or Somali citizens. Despite this fact, the IAO still issues inadmissiblity decisions based on safe third country grounds.

Where the safe third country fails to take back the applicant, the refugee authority shall withdraw its decision and continue the procedure. This provision is not respected in practice. Even though it is clear that Serbia will not accept back asylum seekers from  Hungary, the IAO does not automaticaly withdraw the inadmissiblity decision, but the person needs to apply for asylum again. According to the HHC’s experience asylum seekers have to go through the admissibility assessment for two or even three times and only after submitting the third or fourth asylum application would their case not be declared inadmissible. This results in extremely lenghty procedures which leave people in great depair. Sometimes asylum seekers  would be even detained after receiving a final rejection based on Serbia being a safe third country, despite the fact that deportations to Serbia are not taking place.

A  request  for  judicial review against the IAO decision declaring an application inadmissible has no suspensive effect, except for judicial review regarding inadmissible applications  based on safe third country grounds. The court may not alter the decision of the refugee authority; it shall annul any administrative decision found to be against the law, with the exception of the breach of a procedural rule not affecting the merits of the case, and it shall oblige the refugee authority to conduct a new procedure.

In practice, asylum seekers may face obstacles to lodging a request for judicial review against inadmissibility decisions for the following reasons:
– The 7-day deadline for applying for judicial review appears to be too short for an applicant to be able to benefit from qualified and professional legal assistance, and does not appear to satisfy the requirements of Article 13 ECHR on the right to an effective remedy. Without a functioning and professional legal aid system available for asylum seekers, the vast majority of them have no access to legal assistance when they receive a negative decision from the IAO. Many asylum seekers may fail to understand the reasons for the rejection, especially in case of complicated legal arguments, such as the safe third country concept, and also lack awareness about their right to turn to court. The excessively short deadline makes it difficult for the asylum seeker to exercise her or his right to an effective remedy.
– The  procedure is in Hungarian and the decision on inadmissibility is only translated once i.e. upon its communication to the applicant, in his or her mother tongue or in a language that the applicant may reasonably understand. This prevents the asylum seeker from having a copy of his or her own decision in a language he or she understands so that later he or she could recall the specific reasons why the claim was found inadmissible. The judge has to take a decision in 8 days on a judicial review request. The 8-day deadline for the judge to deliver a decision is insufficient for “a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law” as prescribed by EU law. Five or six working days are not enough for a judge to obtain crucial evidence (such as digested and translated country information, or a medical/psychological expert opinion) or to arrange a personal hearing with a suitable interpreter.
– The lack of an automatic suspensive effect on removal measures is in violation of the principle established in the consistent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which this is an indispensable condition for a remedy to be considered effective in removal cases. While rules under EU asylum law are more permissive in this respect and allow for  the lack of an automatic suspensive effect in case of inadmissibility decisions and accelerated procedures, the lack of an automatic suspensive effect may still raise compatibility  issues with the EU Charter of Fundamental  Rights. The lack of an automatic suspensive effect is in clear violation of EU law with regard to standard procedures, as the Asylum Procedures Directive allows for this option only in certain specific (for example accelerated) procedures. In all cases where the suspensive effect is not automatic, it is difficult to imagine how an asylum seeker will be able to submit a request for the suspension of her/his removal as she/he is typically without professional legal assistance and subject to an unreasonably short deadline to lodge the request. To make it even worse for asylum seekers, the rules allowing for a request to grant a suspensive effect to be submitted are not found in the Asylum Act itself, but they emanate from general rules concerning civil court procedures. The amended Asylum Act lacks any additional safeguards for applicants in need of
special procedural guarantees with regard to the automatic suspensive effect, although this is clearly required by EU law.
– Finally, asylum  seekers often lack  basic skills and do not  understand the decision and the procedure to effectively represent their own case before the court, which only carries out a non-litigious procedure based on the  files of the case and where an oral hearing is rather exceptional. Applicants are not informed that they have to specifically request a hearing in their appeal. The  unreasonably short  time limit and the lack of a personal hearing may reduce the judicial review to a mere formality, in which the judge has no other  information than the documents provided by the IAO.

The European Commission launched an infringement  procedure against Hungary for the violation of asylum-related EU law in December 2015, after a record fast preparatory process. Regarding the asylum  procedure, the Commission is concerned that there is no possibility to refer to new facts and circumstances in the context of appeals and that Hungary is not automatically suspending decisions in case of appeals, effectively forcing applicants to leave their territory before the time limit for lodging an appeal expires, or before an appeal has been heard. Further on, the Commission is also concerned as to the fact that, under the new Hungarian law dealing with the judicial review of decisions rejecting an asylum application, a personal hearing of the applicants is optional. Judicial decisions taken by court secretaries (a sub-judicial level) lacking judicial independence also seem to be in breach of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive and Article 47 of the Charter. The infringement procedure is still not closed.

A subsequent application is considered as an application following a final termination or rejection decision on the former application. New circumstances or facts have to be submitted  in order for a subsequent application to be admissible. For persons whose applications are considered to have been tacitly withdrawn (i.e. they left Hungary and moved on to another EU
Member State) and the asylum procedure had been terminated, the asylum procedure may be continued if the person requests such a continuation within 9 months of the withdrawal of the original application. Where that time-limit has expired, the person is considered to be a subsequent applicant. Persons who withdraw their application in writing cannot request the continuation of their asylum procedure upon return to Hungary; therefore they will have to submit a subsequent application and present new facts or circumstances.

According  to  the  HHC, detention of asylum seekers in Hungary often does not comply with the requirements of ECHR. Asylum seekers in detention in Hungary receive a humanitarian permit while they are in detention, which means that they are explicitly authorised to stay in Hungary during the asylum procedure. Since this is the case, their detention cannot fall under  the Article 5(1)(f) of the Convention, because their detention does not pursue the two purposes mentioned in this provision, namely detention for the purpose of deportation and detention in order to prevent unauthorised entry. Further on, detention for the purpose of establishing their identity also cannot fall under Article 5(1)(b) of the Convention since, under current legislation in Hungary, there is no obligation for asylum seekers to provide documentary evidence of their identity. Therefore detention for the purpose of establishing their identity is unlawful, when asylum seekers make reasonable efforts to clear their identity. All the above is reflected in the O.M. v. Hungary judgment of the ECtHR that became final on 5 October 2016. The judgment also finds that detention was not assessed in a sufficiently individualised manner and that in case of the applicant, who belonged to a vulnerable  group, the authorities did not exercise particular care in order to avoid situations which may reproduce the plight that forced him to flee.

In Békéscsaba and Nyírbátor, when escorted from the facility to court for hearings, or on other outings (such as to visit a hospital, bank or post office), detained asylum seekers are handcuffed and escorted on leashes, which are normally used for the accused in criminal proceedings.

Recognised refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection can stay in the reception centre for 30 days more after their recognition.

NGOs and social workers have reported extreme difficulties for refugees moving out of reception centres and integrating into local communities in practice. Accommodation free of charge
is provided exclusively by civil society organisations and churches. They run homes mostly in Budapest yet the number of places provided is not sufficient. As a result of the lack of places, many of the beneficiaries of international protection are forced to rent apartments or to become homeless. Due to the lack of apartments on the market, the rental fees are too high to be affordable for beneficiaries who have just been granted status. In addition to these difficulties, landlords prefer to let their apartments to Hungarian rather than foreign citizens.

VG Magdeburg / Az.: 5 B 591/16 MD / Ungarn


Nachdem die Kammer noch mit Urteil vom 03.09.2015 (Az. 5 A2 107 90/15 MD) davon ausgegangen ist, dass in Ungarn systemische Mängel im Asylverfahren nicht bestehen, so kann nunmehr aufgrund neuerer Erkenntnismittel sowie obergerichtlicher Rechtsprechung diese Annahme nicht ohne weitere Sachverhaltsaufklärung getroffen werden. Es sind Anhaltspunkte dafür ersichtlich, dass in Ungarn möglicherweise mit systemischen Mängeln des Asylverfahrens zu rechnen ist und ein Asylbewerber Gefahr läuft, mindestens einer erniedrigenden Behandlung ausgesetzt zu werden. So hat er Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württenberg in seinem Urteil vom 13.10.2016 (Az. A 11 S 1596/16, zitiert nach juris) dazu ausgeführt:

„Auch zum heutigen Zeitpunkt ist nach wie vor von einer hohen Inhaftierungsquote auszugehen. Amnesty international teilt unter Berufung auf das Hungary Helsinki Commitee mit, dass zum 01.08.2016 noch etwa 1200 registrierte Flüchtlinge in Ungarn geblieben seien, von denen etwa 700 inhaftiert gewesen seien […].

Diese Quoten begründen nach Überzeugung des Senats in Anbetracht der erheblichen und einschneidenden Folgen einer Inhaftierung für die Betroffenen die erforderliche beachtliche Wahrscheinlichkeit im Sinne eines „real risk“. Ausgehend von diesen Zahlen muss der Kläger dann, wenn er nach Ungarn zurückkehren würde, um dort ein (weiteres) Verfahren auf Gewährung internationalen Schutzes durchzuführen, als alleinstehender Mann mit beachtlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit damit rechnen in Haft zu kommen. Das nach den verwerteten Erkenntnismitteln hoch defizitäre Haftanordnungs- bzw. Haftprüfungsverfahren, das die Betroffenen einer willkürlichen Behandlung aussetzt, und in dem sie in der Regel nicht einmal im Ansatz in ihrer Subjektqualität wahrgenommen werden, verstößt nicht nur gegen die menschenrechtlichen Garantien der Art. 5 und Art. 13 EMRK (vgl. zu dem Aspekt der mangelnden Eröffnung der maßgeblichen Gründe einer Inhaftierung und einer hieraus folgenden Verletzung von Art. 3 EMRK EGMR, Urteil vom 01.09.2015 – Nr. 16483/12, Khlaifia u.a./Italien -, juris; vom. 05.07.2016 – Nr. 9912/15), sondern auch – jedenfalls in Zusammenschau mit den konkreten Haftbedingungen bei desolater Unterbringungssituation und den Handlungsweisen des Personals mit systematischer Schlechtbehandlung – gegen Art. 3 EMRK und damit gegen Art. 4 GRCh. Es ist nach alledem davon auszugehen, dass angesichts der schweren Mängel des Haftanordnungsverfahrens der Kläger keine effektive und faire Chance haben wird, seine Belange in das Verfahren einzubringen und damit gehört zu werden, weshalb es dem Kläger nicht zugemutet werden konnte, in Ungarn ein (weiteres) Verfahren auf internationalen Schutz durchzuführen, mit der Folge, dass mit der Asylantragstellung im Bundesgebiet die Zuständigkeit der Bundesrepublik begründet wurde.


2. Die dargestellte Problematik hat jedoch auch weitergehende Folgen und berührt- ungeachtet der Aufürhungen unter I – die Rechtmäßigkeit der Ziffer 1, in der der Asylantrag als unzulässig abgelehnt worden war.


Zu demselben Ergebnis gelangt auch das OVG Lüneburg in seiner Entscheidung vom 15.11.2016 (Az. LB 92/15, zitiert nach juris) und bejaht ebenfalls das Vorliegen systemischer Mängel in Ungarn hinsichtlich der dortigen Inhaftierungspraxis von Dublin-Rückkehrern, einer Abschiebung nach Serbien ohne inhaltliche Prüfung der Asylanträge von Dublin-Rückkehrern sowie der nicht bestehenden realistischen Möglichkeit von Überstellungen nach Ungarn innerhalb von sechs Monaten nach Rechtskraft der Entscheidung.


OVG Niedersachsen / Az.: 8 LB 92 15 / 12 A 1152/14 / Ungarn


Jedoch ist die Zuständigkeit Ungarns wegen systemischer Mängel des dortigen Asylverfahrens sowie der dortigen Aufnahmebedingungen ausgeschlossen […].

Nach diesen Maßstäben bestehen in Ungarn aktuell grundlegende Defizite sowohl hinsichtlich des Zugangs zum Asylverfahren als auch in Bezug auf dessen Ausgestaltung sowie in Hinblick auf die Aufnahmebedingungen während des Asylverfahrens, die in ihrer Gesamtheit betrachtet, zur Überzeugung des Senats die Annahme rechtfertigen, dass dem Kläger bei einer Überstellung mit beachtlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit eine unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung i.S.v. Art. 4 EUGrCh bzw. Art. 3 EMRK droht […].

Bei einer Rücküberstellung nach Ungarn droht dem Kläger mit beachtlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit eine Inhaftierung ohne individualisierte Prüfung von Haftgründen […]. Die Entscheidung, ob ein Asylbewerber in Asylhaft genommen oder einer offenen Aufnahmeeinrichtung zugewiesen wird, wird nach den zur Verfügung stehenden Erkenntnismitteln regelmäßig ohne nachvollziehbare Gründe, mithin willkürlich, vorgenommen […]. Behördliche und gerichtliche Haftanordnungen und -prüfungen erfolgen im Regelfall
schematisch ohne Prüfung des Einzelfalls und ohne Abwägung milderer Mittel.

Die Haftbedingungen in den ungarischen Asylhaftanstalten lassen nach der bestehenden Auskunftslage ebenfalls zum Teil erhebliche Mängel erkennen […]. Die ausgelasteten, allerdings nicht (mehr) überfüllten Asylhaftanstalten […] weisen den Erkenntnismitteln zufolge zahlreiche Missstände auf. Inhaftierte Asylbewerber werden wie Strafgefangene behandelt, indem sie zu gerichtlichen Anhörungen oder anderen Terminen außerhalb der Haftanstalt mit Handschellen
und angeleint gebracht werden […]. Hygienische Mindeststandards (Duschen, Toiletten) werden teilweise nicht eingehalten und Häftlinge beklagen sich über einen zu geringen Nährwert der Mahlzeiten und den daraus resultierenden Gewichtsverlust […]. Zudem wird auch über Beschimpfungen, Schikanierungen und Gewaltanwendungen seitens des Wachpersonals […]. Im Herbst 2015 stellte die Nichtregierungsorganisation „Human Rights Watch“ bei einem Besuch von fünf Haftanstalten fest, dass dort Schwangere, begleitete und unbegleitete Kinder sowie Menschen mit Behinderungen für lange Zeit festgehalten wurden, wobei Frauen und Familien mit kleinen Kindern die Einrichtungen teilweise mit alleinstehenden Männern
teilen mussten. In der Haftanstalt „Nyirbator“ wurde die Organisation darauf aufmerksam, dass die dort inhaftierten Asylbewerber Hautausschlag und Stiche von Bettwanzen aufwiesen und bei Temperaturen von um die 5° C mit unzureichender Kleidung ausgestattet waren […]. Eine grundlegende medizinische Versorgung wird in den Asylhaftanstalten zwar angeboten […], jedoch wird nach den zur Verfügung stehenden Berichten mit den
unterschiedlichen gesundheitlichen Problemen nicht in einer auf den Einzelfall abstellenden Weise umgegangen. So werden immer wieder die gleichen Tabletten für unterschiedliche Krankheiten verabreicht […]. Zudem bestehen eine adäquate Behandlung regelmäßig erschwerende Kommunikationsprobleme auf Grund fehlender Dolmetscher […]. So berichtet die Nichtregierungsorganisation „Cordelia Foundation“ über einen im Rahmen eines Besuchs in einer Haftanstalt wahrgenommenen Fall, in dem einem syrischen
Flüchtling bei der Ankunft dessen Diabetesmedikamente abgenommen worden waren und im Rahmen der medizinischen Eingangsuntersuchung die daraufhin einsetzende Unterzuckerung nicht wahrgenommen wurde. Nachdem die Mitarbeiter der Nichtregierungsorganisation das medizinische Personal darauf aufmerksam gemacht hatten, begründeten diese den Vorfall mit dem Fehlen eines Dolmetschers für die arabische Sprache bei der Untersuchung […].

Ein weiterer systemischer Mangel besteht darin, dass sich nicht ausschließen lässt, dass Ungarn Dublin-Rückkehrer ohne inhaltliche Prüfung ihrer Asylanträge weiter nach Serbien als „sicheren Drittstaat“ abschiebt, was einen indirekten Verstoß gegen das Refoulement-Verbot des Art. 33 Abs. 1 GFK zur Folge hätte, weil Serbien seinerseits kein Asylverfahren aufweist, das eine inhaltliche Prüfung der Fluchtgründe garantiert […], Die in Ungarn gegen die Asylantragsablehnung auf der Grundlage der sicheren Drittstaatenregelung vorgesehene gerichtliche Überprüfung erweist sich nicht als Gewährung effektiven Rechtsschutzes. Die ungarische Asylbehörde hat dem aus einem sicheren Drittstaat eingereisten Asylbewerber eine Anhörungsfrist von drei Tagen einzuräumen, innerhalb derer er geltend machen kann, weshalb der Drittstaat in seinem Einzelfall nicht als sicherer Drittstatt zu qualifizieren ist, bevor sie den Antrag als unzulässig ablehnen kann […]. Dagegen hat der Asylbewerber lediglich eine Klagefrist von sieben Tagen […] Im gerichtlichen Verfahren muss er den vollen Beweis erbringen, dass er in Serbien nicht die Möglichkeit hatte, sein Asylgesuch anzubringen […], was in der Praxis schon wegen der gesetzlich vorgegebenen Entscheidungsfrist des Gerichts von acht Tagen, des faktisch
eingeschränkten Zugangs zu rechtlichem Beistand und des Ausschlusses neuen Tatsachenvortrags nahezu unmöglich sein dürfte […]. Unter anderem wegen des Ausschlusses neuen Tatsachenvortrags hat die Europäische Kommission ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen Ungarn eingeleitet […]. Selbst in Fällen, in denen die ungarischen Gerichte Rechtsschutz gegen die Asylantragsablehnung gewährt haben, folgt die ungarische Asylbehörde der gerichtlichen Entscheidung offenbar nicht und lehnt die Anträge ein zweites Mal als unzulässig mit der Folge ab, dass erneut Rechtsschutz in Anspruch genommen werden muss […].

Das ungarische Asylverfahren weist weitere erhebliche Mängel auf, die den Kläger als Dublin-Rückkehrer zwar nur teilweise unmittelbar betreffen, jedoch aufzeigen, dass die zuvor ausgeführten Defizite nicht die einzigen Mängel des ungarischen Asylverfah rens sind, sondern vielmehr einen Teil von systemisch angelegten Defiziten darstellen. So hat die Europäische Kommission im Dezember 2015 ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen Ungarn eingeleitet, weil zu befürchten sei, „dass es im Rahmen von Rechtsbehelfen nicht möglich ist, auf neue Fakten und Umstände zu verweisen, und
dass Ungarn Entscheidungen im Falle der Einlegung von Rechtsbehelfen nicht automatisch aussetzt, sondern dass Antragsteller bereits vor Verstreichen der Frist für die
Einlegung eines Rechtsbehelfs oder vor der Prüfung des Rechtsbehelfs effektiv gezwungen werden, ungarisches Hoheitsgebiet zu verlassen“. Außerdem bestünden „im Hinblick auf das Grundrecht auf einen wirksamen Rechtsbehelf und ein unparteiisches Gericht nach Artikel 47 der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union Bedenken
hinsichtlich der Tatsache, dass gemäß den neuen ungarischen Vorschriften zur gerichtlichen Überprüfung von Entscheidungen über die Ablehnung eines Asylantrags
eine persönliche Anhörung der Antragsteller fakultativ ist“. Zudem scheine „der Umstand, dass gerichtliche Entscheidungen von Gerichtssekretären auf vorgerichtlicher
Ebene getroffen werden, einen Verstoß gegen die Asylverfahrensrichtlinie und Artikel 47 der Grundrechtecharta zu begründen“ […]. Weiterhin dürfen die ungarischen Gerichte auf Grund einer zum 1. September 2015 in Kraft getretenen Gesetzesänderung die Entscheidungen der ungarischen Asylbehörde nicht mehr abändern, sondern diese lediglich anweisen, den Fall erneut zu prüfen, was in der Praxis
dazu führt, dass diese häufig ihre Entscheidung ohne vertiefte Prüfung lediglich wiederholt und erneut Rechtsschutz gesucht werden muss […].

Durch mehrere Gesetzesänderungen zum 1. April 2016 und 1. Juni 2016 besteht selbst für Flüchtlinge, die in Ungarn einen Schutzstatus erhalten, die Gefahr der anschließenden Verelendung und Obdachlosigkeit […). Insbesondere ist es mit Art. 3 EMRK unvereinbar, wenn sich ein Asylbewerber, der von staatlicher Unterstützung vollständig abhängig ist und sich in
einer gravierenden Mangel- oder Notsituation befindet, staatlicher Gleichgültigkeit aus gesetzt sieht […].

Sowohl die in den Jahren 2015 und 2016 beschlossenen asylrechtlichen Gesetzesänderungen als auch die politische Rhetorik der ungarischen Regierung legen den Schluss
nahe, dass es sich um bewusst zur Verringerung der Flüchtlingszahlen angelegte, systemische Mängel handelt […].

Die Ablehnung des Antrags auf Durchführung eines weiteren Asylverfahrens ist darüber hinaus auch deshalb rechtswidrig, weil nicht davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass eine realistische Möglichkeit besteht, dass der Kläger innerhalb von sechs Monaten nach Rechtskraft nach Ungarn überstellt werden könnte […]. Um [den] Anspruch auf effektiven Zugang
zum Asylverfahren und auf zügige Sachprüfung nicht ins Leere laufen zu lassen, hat ein Mitgliedstaat sein Selbsteintrittsrecht auszuüben, wenn die Überstellung an den an sich für zuständig erachteten Mitgliedstaat wegen dessen mangelnder Aufnahmebereitschaft aussichtslos erscheint […].

Vor diesem Hintergrund erweist sich die Abschiebungsanordnung nicht nur mangels Zuständigkeit eines anderen Staats, sondern auch deshalb als rechtswidrig, weil § 34a Abs. 1 Satz 1 AsylG die tatsächliche Möglichkeit der Abschiebung voraussetzt. Danach ordnet das Bundesamt, wenn der Ausländer in einen für die Durchführung des Asylver-
fahrens zuständigen Staat (§ 29 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 AsylG) abgeschoben werden soll, die Abschiebung in diesen Staat an, sobald feststeht, dass sie durchgeführt werden kann.
Den zuvor gemachten Ausführungen zufolge kann nicht von einer realistischen Möglichkeit zur Durchführung der Abschiebung ausgegangen werden.


VGH Baden-Württemberg / Az.: A 11 S 1596/16 / Ungarn


Das nach den verwerteten Erkenntnismitteln hoch defizitäre Haftanordnungs- bzw. Haftprüfungsverfahren, das die Betroffenen einer willkürlichen Behandlung aussetzt, und in dem sie in der Regel nicht einmal im Ansatz in ihrer Subjektqualität wahrgenommen werden, verstößt nicht nur gegen die menschenrechtlichen Garantien der Art. 5 und Art. 13 EMRK (vgl. zu dem Aspekt der mangelnden Eröffnung der maßgeblichen Gründe einer Inhaftierung und einer hieraus folgenden Verletzung von Art. 3 EMRK EGMR, Urteil vom 01.09.2015 – Nr. 16483/12, Khlaifia u.a./Italien -, juris; vom. 05.07.2016 – Nr. 9912/15), sondern auch – jedenfalls in Zusammenschau mit den konkreten Haftbedingungen bei desolater Unterbringungssituation und den Handlungsweisen des Personals mit systematischer Schlechtbehandlung – gegen Art. 3 EMRK und damit gegen Art. 4 GRCh. Es ist nach alledem davon auszugehen, dass angesichts der schweren Mängel des Haftanordnungsverfahrens der Kläger keine effektive und faire Chance haben wird, seine Belange in das Verfahren einzubringen und damit gehört zu werden, weshalb es dem Kläger nicht zugemutet werden konnte, in Ungarn ein (weiteres) Verfahren auf internationalen Schutz durchzuführen, mit der Folge, dass mit der Asylantragstellung im Bundesgebiet die Zuständigkeit der Bundesrepublik begründet wurde. […]

Das ungarische Asylsystem weist ungeachtet dessen auch in anderer Hinsicht weitere schwere systemische Mängel auf, worauf es aber nicht mehr entscheidend ankommt. So behandelt Ungarn u.a. Serbien als sicheren Drittstaat (vgl. aida II, S. 43 f.; vgl. auch eccre/aida, Crossing Boundaries, October 2015, 34 ff. auch zur rückwirkenden Anwendung der Drittstaatenregelung), womit die massenhaften Einreiseverweigerungen und Zurückschiebungen an der serbisch-ungarischen Grenze zu erklären sind (vgl. u.a. aida II, S. 30 ff.; Hungarian Helsinki Committee, No Country for Refugees, 28.09.2015; ai, Stranded Hope, S. 14 f.). Serbien seinerseits sieht u.a. Griechenland, Mazedonien und die Türkei als sichere Drittstaaten an. […]

Schließlich weist der Senat darauf hin, dass es nachvollziehbare und glaubhafte aktuelle Schilderungen über die Behandlung von gestrandeten Flüchtlingen an der ungarischen Grenze gibt, die deutlich machen, dass Ungarn nicht nur ständig das Refoulement-Verbot verletzt, sondern dabei auch exzessive Gewalt anwendet. Minimale menschenrechtliche Standards werden auch dadurch verletzt, dass im Rahmen des Grenzregimes wiederholte erfolgreiche Versuche gegeben hat, ungarische NGOs daran zu hindern, durch eigene Hilfsmaßnahmen und Hilfsprojekte die äußerst schlechten Lebensbedingungen der an der Grenze ausharrenden Menschen zu lindern (amnesty international, So schlecht wie möglich, August 2016). Diese bei den handelnden staatlichen Organen offensichtlich vorherrschende ablehnende bis gar feindliche Grundeinstellung gegenüber Flüchtlingen, die in vielfach geschilderten Gewaltexzessen und in der inhumanen Verhinderung von Hilfseinsetzen von ungarischen NGOs exemplarisch zum Ausdruck kommt, lässt nach Überzeugung des Senats auch Rückschlüsse auf die oben geschilderte Schlechtbehandlung in der Asylhaft zu. Die Plausibilität und Glaubhaftigkeit der diesbezüglichen Berichte wird dadurch untermauert. Diese Feststellungen haben daher indirekt auch Relevanz für die Einschätzung der (künftigen) Situation des Klägers. […]

Abschließend weist der Senat noch darauf hin, dass am 10.12.2015 die Europäische Kommission gegen Ungarn ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren eingeleitet hat (vgl. Presserklärung der Europäischen Kommission vom 10.12.2015). Dieses hat im Wesentlichen die Effektivität des Rechtsschutzes zum Gegenstand. […]

Die in Ziffer 2 verfügte Abschiebungsanordnung setzt nach § 34a Abs. 1 AsylG voraus, dass die Abschiebung in den zuständigen Mitgliedstaat erfolgen kann und dies auch alsbald der Fall sein wird. Bestehen hinreichende Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass dieses nicht der Fall sein könnte, ist die Beklagte ggf.
darlegungspflichtig, dass diese Voraussetzungen gleichwohl (noch) vorliegen (vgl. BVerwG, Urteil vom 27.04.2016 – 1 C 24.15 -, juris). Zum einen ergab sich schon aus dem von der Beklagten selbst dem Senat bereits im Verfahren A 11 S 976/16 vorgelegten Quartalsbericht IV 2015 zum Mitgliedstaat Ungarn vom 27.01.2016, dass im gesamten Jahr 2015 von 33.220 Zustimmungsfällen tatsächlich nur 1.402 nach Ungarn überstellt worden waren, was einer Quote von 4,2 v.H. entsprach; im 4. Quartal war die Quote sogar auf 3,3 v.H. gesunken. Die mittlerweile vorliegende Dublin-Statistik für das 1. Halbjahr und das von der Beklagten im vorliegenden Verfahren vorgelegte statistische Material zeichnen ein vergleichbares Bild; die Überstellungsquote betrug im gesamten 1. Halbjahr 2016 lediglich 7,14 v.H. (vgl. BAMF: Dublin-Statistik 1. Jahreshälfte 2016), was unübersehbar zu einem enormen Rückstau von Überstellungen geführt haben muss. Erst um die Jahresmitte 2016 hat sich die Quote deutlich verbessert, was ersichtlich auf die gesunkene Zahl
von Zustimmungen Ungarns zurückzuführen ist. Die Zahlen der erfolgten Überstellungen liegen aber immer noch deutlich unter der Zahl der Zustimmungen. An der sehr niedrigen Überstellungsquote und dem infolge dessen entstandenen extremen Rückstau hat sich somit nichts Grundlegendes geändert, er wächst sogar weiter ständig an. Allerdings finden durchaus regelmäßig Überstellungen statt, obwohl offizielle ungarische Verlautbarungen etwas anderes nahe legen. Soweit die Beklagte darauf abhebt, dass bei der Beurteilung und der Bewertung der Überstellungsquote berücksichtigt werden müssen, dass „viele“ Abschiebungen aus mancherlei Gründen nicht durchgeführt werden könnten, etwa weil sich die Betroffenen verweigern oder entziehen würden, so ist dieses zweifellos richtig. In der mündlichen Verhandlung wurde dieser Aspekt, insbesondere die naheliegende Frage, was unter „viele“ zu verstehen ist erörtert, von der Beklagten aber nicht beantwortet oder erläutert, da sie ohne vorherige Mitteilung der Verhandlung fern geblieben ist. Auch hatte die Beklagte auf die Anfrage des Senats, kein bestimmtes Handlungsmuster darlegen können, nach dem die Überstellungen durchgeführt und v.a. der Rückstau abgearbeitet werden soll, wobei hier nochmals darauf hinzuweisen ist, dass dieser gegenwärtig noch weiter zunimmt. Allein deshalb ist Ziffer 2 der angegriffenen Verfügung aufzuheben. Der Senat sieht sich in seiner Einschätzung, dass der erhebliche Rückstau nicht in absehbarer Zeit abgebaut werden kann und wird, darin bestätigt, dass das für die Aufenthaltsbeendigung in ganz Baden-Württemberg zuständige Regierungspräsidium Karlsruhe auf die Anfrage des Senats am 12.10.2016 mitgeteilt hat, dass im gesamten Jahre 2016 bislang 12 Überstellungen nach Ungarn durchgeführt worden sind. Bereits aufgrund dessen ist die Abschiebungsanordnung aufzuheben.

Die dargestellte Problematik hat jedoch auch weitergehende Folgen und berührt – ungeachtet der Ausführungen unter I – die Rechtmäßigkeit der Ziffer 1, in der der Asylantrag als unzulässig abgelehnt worden war. [….]



Zusammenfassung des Berichts:

Fences, teargas, and draconian legislation: over the last year the Hungarian authorities have baulked at little in their determination to keep refugees and migrants out of the country. The government’s programme of militarization, criminalization and isolation – that it touts as “Schengen 2.0” – has ushered in a set of measures which have resulted in violent push-backs at the border with Serbia, unlawful detentions inside the country and dire living conditions for those waiting at the border. While the Hungarian government has spent millions of Euros on a xenophobic advertising campaign, refugees are left to languish.

The Hungarian government’s anti-refugee campaign will reach a new nadir on 2 October 2016 when Hungarians will be asked to vote on the mandatory relocation of asylum-seekers in Hungary. But the real questions are bigger; is Hungary prepared to accept refugees at all? Is it prepared to work within the framework of EU rules to find shared solutions to an EU-wide challenge? The government’s intentional blurring of the lines between seeking asylum and other forms of migration goes hand in hand with its labelling refugees and migrants as “illegal” and as threats to national security. The toxic rhetoric of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, calling asylum-seekers “poison”, has trickled down to the level of local government and often permeates the context in which police and local asylum centres operate.

Hungary has erected a series of legal and physical barriers around the country to keep refugees and migrants out. It has constructed a border fence at its southern border with Serbia and Croatia, and criminalized irregular entry across it. Within a year, close to three thousand refugees and migrants were penalized. Thousands of people have also been denied entry or returned forcibly to Serbia since the law was changed in July 2016 to allow the immediate return of those caught at the border fence or up to 8 km inside Hungarian territory.

The Hungarian government has not been content to isolate itself behind its fences. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has, instead, invested considerable energy into convincing EU colleagues of the merits of “Schengen 2.0”. He has even found some support. This briefing documents some of the pernicious consequences of Hungary’s current policies and gives a taste of what awaits refugees seeking sanctuary in Europe if other countries seek to replicate them. This briefing documents the plight of refugees and migrants as they wait in dire conditions to enter the country; as they get pushed back to Serbia, sometimes violently and without access to any procedure; as they are routinely detained in centres where they are “treated like animals” and as they make their way through an asylum procedure designed to reject them.

The only way to enter Hungary regularly and apply for asylum is through its “transit zones”, a set of metal containers set up at the border following the completion of the border fence. Only 30 people are admitted to the “transit zones” each day; others languish in substandard conditions in makeshift camps at the border area, or in overcrowded centres across Serbia waiting for their turn to arrive to enter Hungary, based on an “entering plan” submitted by asylum-seekers themselves. Hungary fails to ensure that those who can’t be admitted to the asylum procedure immediately receive humane treatment, including access to sanitation, medical care and adequate accommodation conditions.

With such heavy restrictions on regular entry to the country, many choose to cross the border irregularly after months of waiting. They are stopped and returned immediately, without any consideration of their needs for protection or particular vulnerabilities. Refugees and migrants told Amnesty International about excessive use of force, including beatings, kicking and chasing back with dogs and unlawful returns (or “push backs”) to Serbia. Inside the “transit zone” containers, authorities unlawfully detain without ground most men traveling without family for up to four weeks. Most of them have their asylum applications declared inadmissible on the grounds that they came through Serbia, a “safe third country”, where they should have applied for asylum.

As Serbia does not formally take them back and does not provide access to a fair and individualized asylum process, those pushed back out of the containers have little other option than to attempt a different route to the EU. Those who do get into the country risk a multitude of further rights violations. The detention of asylum-seekers has become routine. In early August, over half of the twelve hundred asylum-seekers residing in Hungary were in asylum detention. Despite repeated requests, Amnesty International was not allowed to visit the asylum detention centres to document the conditions asylum-seekers were kept in. However, the organization has interviewed several former detainees in the Körmend tent camp and in Austria, who reported beatings and threats of violence by the police and security guards inside the detention centre. They also spoke of the frustration and trauma among the asylum-seekers locked up without having committed a crime. Amnesty International interviewed several asylum-seekers who harmed themselves in desperation.

Families and vulnerable persons are taken from “transit zones” to open reception centres inside the country where they face a different set of challenges. They languish in conditions which are often unsuitable for long-term accommodation, and where information on and assistance with asylum applications are lacking and support to access essential services is minimal. These centres barely provide education, activities for children and healthcare. The lack of translators and a lengthy, complex asylum process create often insurmountable obstacles to their asylum cases.

Hungary is, on multiple counts, in flagrant breach of international human rights and refugee law and EU directives on asylum procedures, reception conditions, and the Dublin regulation. The Hungarian authorities continue to intentionally undermine any agreement that could protect the rights of refugees and migrants to safely and legally arrive in the European Union, be treated with dignity, and have a fair and individual opportunity to make their cases heard. This briefing makes the case for the European Commission to take the infringement proceedings it has started against Hungary further and hold Hungary accountable and bring the country’s migration and asylum policies in line with EU and international law obligations.

Human Rights Watch: Hungary – Migrants Abused at the Border


“Hungary is breaking all the rules for asylum seekers transiting through Serbia, summarily dismissing claims and sending them back across the border,” said Lydia Gall, Balkans and Eastern Europe researcher at Human Rights Watch. “People who cross into Hungary without permission, including women and children, have been viciously beaten and forced back across the border.”

EU member states should refrain from returning any asylum seekers to Hungary until it ensures meaningful access to asylum, including adequate time for a substantive in-country appeal and should halt violent and other summary returns of asylum seekers to Serbia, Human Rights Watch said.

Stellungnahme des HHC: Weitere Gesetzesverschärfungen in Ungarn


  • Termination of monthly cash allowance of free use for asylum-seekers
  • Termination of school-enrolment benefit previously provided to child-asylum-seekers
  • Terminating theintegration support scheme for recognis
    ed refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection introduced in 2013, without replacing it with any alternative measure
  • Irregular migrants (regardless of whether or notthey claim asylum) who are arrested within 8 km (5 miles)of either
    the Serbian-Hungarian or the Croatian-Hungarian border
    will be “escorted” by the police to the external side of the
    border fence, without assessing their protection needs or even registering them
  • [….]

Neuer UNHCR-Bericht zu Ungarn


Executive Summary:

In UNHCR’s view, legislation and related Decrees adopted by Hungary in July and September 2015, and progressively implemented between July 2015 and 31 March 2016, have had the combined effect of limiting and deterring access to asylum in the country. These include, most notably, the following.

(a) the erection of a fence along Hungary’s borders with Serbia and Croatia, accompanied by the introduction of a procedure in which individuals arriving at the border who wish to submit an asylum application in Hungary must do so in special “transit zones” in which the asylum procedure and reception conditions are not in accordance with European Union (EU) and international standards, in particular concerning procedural safeguards, judicial review and freedom of movement. (See Section D below). In addition, the government plans to erect a fence along the Romanian-Hungarian border beginning at the Serbian-Hungarian-Romanian triple border.

(b) the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept to countries on the principal route followed by asylum-seekers to Hungary – namely Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia – without adequate procedural safeguards, and despite the fact that no other EU Member State applies a presumption of safety to those countries 6 and that UNHCR.

(c) the criminalization of irregular entry into Hungary through the border fence, punishable by actual or suspended terms of imprisonment of up to ten years – and/or the imposition of an expulsion border. Prison sentences, at variance with the EU Return Directive, are imposed following fast-tracked trials of questionable fairness, and are not suspended in the event that the concerned individual submits an asylum application. The proper consideration of a defence under Article 31 of the 1951 Convention that the individual had come directly from a territory where his or life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1 of that Convention is thus prevented.

There has also been a reduction of permanent open reception capacity for asylum-seekers through the closure of the centre in Debrecen, which had been the largest open asylum reception centre in the country, at the very time when substantially increased reception capacity for asylum-seekers is needed and the opening of an asylum detention centre in Kiskunhalas. These measures and development should also be considered in the context of the wider use of detention in generally inadequate conditions based on previous laws and practices adopted prior to the period covered by this paper.

In conclusion, UNHCR considers these significant aspects of Hungarian law and practice raise serious concerns as regards compatibility with international and European law, and may be at variance with the country’s international and European obligations.