Die ungarische Regierung verschärft die Gesetze in der Flüchtlingskrise – und die Bundesregierung ist alarmiert. Können Asylsuchende noch nach Ungarn zurückgeschickt werden? Offenbar hat das Bundesinnenministerium (BMI) Zweifel, ob die ungarischen Behörden die EU-Regeln zur Unterbringung von Flüchtlingen und die EU-Standards für die Asylverfahren noch erfüllen. Laut einem Erlass des BMI vom 6. April schickt das Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) Schutzsuchende für ein EU-Asylverfahren nur noch in das östliche EU-Land zurück, sofern dortige Behörden dem BAMF die EU-Standards in jedem Einzelfall vorab garantieren.
Archiv der Kategorie: Familienstand
Stellungnahme des UNHCR: UNHCR urges suspension of transfers of asylum-seekers to Hungary under Dublin
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, today called for a temporary suspension of all transfers of asylum-seekers to Hungary from other European States under the Dublin Regulation. The Dublin regulation is an EU instrument that determines which European State is responsible for examining an asylum seeker’s application.
“The situation for asylum-seekers in Hungary, which was already of deep concern to UNHCR, has only gotten worse since the new law introducing mandatory detention for asylum-seekers came into effect,” said Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
“Given the worsening situation of asylum-seekers in Hungary, I urge States to suspend any Dublin transfer of asylum-seekers to this country until the Hungarian authorities bring their practices and policies in line with European and international law,” he added.
The High Commissioner said that he was “encouraged” by the decision taken by the European Commission to work with the Hungarian authorities with a view to bringing the new legislation and Hungary’s practice in line with EU law, but noted that “urgent measures are needed to improve access to asylum in Hungary.”
UNHCR has repeatedly raised its concerns over the situation of refugees and asylum-seekers arriving to Hungary with the authorities and the EU, stressing that physical barriers and restrictive policies have resulted in effectively denying access to territory and asylum.
Hungary’s “emergency measures” under the amended law on asylum expand mandatory detention of asylum seekers and lead to the expulsion from the country of anyone who enters the country irregularly, in violation of the country’s obligations under international law.
Since it came into force on 28 March, new asylum-seekers, including children, are detained in shipping containers surrounded by high razor fences at the border for the entire length of their asylum procedures. As of 7 April, there were 110 people, including four unaccompanied children and children with their families, held there.
“While acknowledging the authorities’ recent efforts to address police violence, we remain very concerned about highly disturbing reports of serious incidents of ill-treatment and violence against people crossing the border into Hungary, including by State agents,” Grandi said. “These unacceptable practices must be brought to an end and I urge the Hungarian authorities to further investigate any allegation of abuse and violence,” he added.
Back in December, UNHCR presented a series of proposals to the EU and Member States to improve the distribution of asylum claims among Member States. The High Commissioner also called for the European Union to adopt a simplified asylum system that would identify, register and process arrivals swiftly and efficiently. “This is key to ensure access to protection for those who need it and to restore public trust,” he said.
“It is important that asylum systems as well as reception conditions are further improved in many EU and candidates States. This will help reduce irregular onward movements and the increasing reliance on smugglers. It will also help to reduce current pressure at the Hungary’s southern border. Investing in the integration of asylum seekers and refugees must also be an integral part of the equation,” said Grandi.
OVG Berlin-Brandenburg / Az.: 3 S 102.106 / Ungarn
Der Senat hat mit Beschluss vom heutigen Tag in dem Verfahren – OVG 3 N 136.16 – die Berufung zugelassen, weil die Rechtssache nach den Darlegungen des Klägers grundsätzliche Bedeutung hat […]. Denn sie wirft danach die – vom Verwaltungsgericht verneinte – klärungsbedürftige Tatsachenfrage auf, ob das Asylverfahren und die Aufnahmebedingungen in Ungarn systemische Mängel aufweisen, die im Rahmen der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 604/2013 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 26. Juni 2013 zur Festlegung der Kriterien und Verfahren zur Bestimmung des Mitgliedstaats, der für die Prüfung eines Drittstaatsangehörigen oder Staatenlosen in einem Mitgliedstaat gestellten Antrags auf internationalen Schutz zuständig ist (Dublin III-VO), beachtlich sind.
VG Würzburg / Az.: W 2 17.50159 / Ungarn
Mit Beschluss vom 23. Februar 2017 (W 2 S 16.50198) lehnte das Gericht den Antrag der Antragsteller auf Anordnung der aufschiebenden Wirkung ihrer Klage gegen den Bescheid des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge vom 7. Dezember 2016 ab. Auf den Inhalt des Beschlusses wird Bezug genommen.
Mit Schriftsatz ihres Bevollmächtigten vom 26- März 2017, bei Gericht eingegangen am selben Tag, begehren die Antragsteller die Abänderung des Beschlusses vom 23. Februar 2017.
Zur Begründung wurde auf das Vorliegen neuer Erkenntnismittel – den mit Datum vom 7. Februar 2017 veröffentlichen neuen aida-Bericht zu Ungarn sowie das Information update des Hungarian Helsinki Comittee vom 15. Februar 2017 – verwiesen sowie die vom ungarischen Parlament am 7. März 2017 beschlossene drastische Verschärfung der Asylgesetzgebung, wonach Flüchtlinge Asyl nur noch in sog. Transitzonen beantragen könnten, die sie für die Dauer des Verfahrens nicht verlassen dürften, sowie auf die Berufungszulassung des Bayerischen Verwaltungsgerichtshofs mit Beschluss vom 25. Januar 2017 im Verfahren 13a ZB 16.50076 wegen grundsätzlicher Bedeutung der Frage systemischer Mängel des Asylverfahrens und der Aufnahmebedingungen in Ungarn […].
Gemäß 5 80 Abs. 7 VwGO kann das Gericht der Hauptsache jederzeit, d.h. ohne Bindung an Fristen, von Amts wegen oder – wie hier – auf Antrag eines Beteiligten einen Beschluss über einen Antrag nach § 80 Abs. 5 VwGO wegen veränderter oder im ursprünglichen Verfahren ohne Verschulden nicht geltend gemachter Umstände ändern oder aufheben.
Eine Veränderung der Umstände im Sinne von § 80 Abs. 7 VwGO ergibt sich hier aus den vom ungarischen Parlament am 7. März 2017 beschlossenen und am 28. März 2017 in Kraft getretenen Verschärfungen der Asylregelungen, wonach Asylsuchende – auch unbegleitete Minderjährige ab 14 Jahren – während der gesamten Dauer ihres Asylverfahrens ausnahmslos in Transitzonen inhaftiert werden sollen. Seitens des Menschenrechtskommissars des Europarates und zahlreicher Menschenrechts-Nichtregierungsorganisationen wurden die Neuregelungen scharf kritisiert. Der UNHCR, dessen Stellungnahmen im Asylverfahren anerkanntermaßen besonderes Gewicht zukommt, zeigte sich in seiner Stellungnahme vom 7. März 2017 „zutiefst besorgt“ über die geplante Internierung von Schutzsuchenden. Mit Eilanordnung vom 27. März 2017 hat der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte zudem die Verlegung von acht unbegleiteten Minderjährigen und einer schwangeren Asylbewerberin in Transitzonen gestoppt.
Nach alledem bedarf es näherer Prüfung im Hauptsacheverfahren, ob die neuen gesetzlichen Regelungen im ungarischen Asylrecht europäischem und sonstigem internationalen Recht genügen und ob sie geeignet sind, systemische Mängel des ungarischen Asylsystems zu begründen.
Darüber hinaus hat der Bayerische Verwaltungsgerichtshof mit Beschluss vom 25. Januar 2017 im Verfahren 13a ZB 16.50076 die Berufung zur Klärung der Frage zugelassen, ob das Asylverfahren und die Aufnahmebedingungen in Ungarn systemische Mängel aufweisen, die im Rahmen der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 604/2013 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 26. Juli 2013 beachtlich sind.
EGMR / Az.: 47287/15 / Ungarn
49. The Government were of the view that since the applicants had been free to leave the territory of the transit zone in the direction of Serbia, they in fact had not been deprived of their personal liberty. Article 5 of the Convention was therefore inapplicable.
52. It must be determined in the first place whether the placing of the applicants in the transit zone constituted a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. The Court has already found that holding aliens in an international zone involves a restriction upon liberty which is not in every respect comparable to that obtained in detention centres. However, such confinement is acceptable only if it is accompanied by safeguards for the persons concerned and is not prolonged excessively. Otherwise, a mere restriction on liberty is turned into a deprivation of liberty (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 43, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996-III, and Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787/03 and 29810/03, § 68, 24 January 2008).68. The motives underlying the applicants’ detention may well be those referred to by the Government in the context of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention, that is to counter abuses of the asylum procedure. However, for the Court the fact remains that the applicants were deprived of their liberty without any formal decision of the authorities and solely by virtue of an elastically interpreted general provision of the law – a procedure which in the Court’s view falls short of the requirements enounced in the Court’s case-law. The conditions of Article 31/A of the Asylum Act were not met and no formal decision was taken; furthermore no special grounds for detention in the transit zone were provided for in Article 71/A. In this connection the Court would reiterate that it has considered the absence of any grounds given by the judicial authorities in their decisions authorising detention for a prolonged period of time, as in the present case to be incompatible with the principle of the protection from arbitrariness enshrined in Article 5 § 1 (see Stašaitis v. Lithuania, no. 47679/99, § 67, 21 March 2002; Nakhmanovich v. Russia, no. 55669/00, § 70, 2 March 2006; Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967/01, § 91, 1 March 2007, and
Mooren v. Germany [GC], no 11364/03, § 79, 9 July 2009).69. It follows that the applicants’ detention cannot be considered “lawful” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Consequently, there has been a violation of that provision.
75. The Court observes that the applicants’ detention consisted in a de facto measure, not supported by any decision specifically addressing the issue of deprivation of liberty (see paragraph 67 above). Moreover, the proceedings suggested by the Government concerned the applicants’ asylum applications rather than the question of personal liberty. In these circumstances, it is quite inconceivable how the applicants could have pursued any judicial review of their committal to, and detention in, the transit zone – which itself had not been ordered in any formal proceedings or taken the shape of a decision.
76. The Court therefore must conclude that the applicants did not have at their disposal any “proceedings by which the lawfulness of [their] detention [could have been] decided speedily by a court”.
77. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
89. In view of the satisfactory material conditions and the relatively short time involved, the Court concludes that the treatment complained of did not reach the minimum level of severity necessary to constitute inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.
90. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it finds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
100. The Court further observes that the Government have not indicated any remedies by which the applicants could have complained about the conditions in which they were held in the transit zone.
101. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the Convention.
118. The Court observes that the applicants were removed from Hungary on the strength of the Government Decree listing Serbia as a safe third country and establishing a presumption in this respect. The individualised assessment of their situation with regard to any risk they ran if returned to Serbia took place in these legal circumstances. Indeed, it involved a reversal of the burden of proof to the applicants’ detriment including the burden to prove the real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment in a chain-refoulement situation to Serbia and then the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, eventually driving them to Greece. However, it is incumbent on the domestic authorities to carry out an assessment of that risk of their own motion when information about such a risk is ascertainable from a wide number of sources. Not only that the Hungarian authorities did not perform this assessment in the determination of the individual risks but they refused even to consider the merits of the information provided by the counsel, limiting their argument to the position of the Government Decree 191/2015.
125. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that the applicants did not have the benefit of effective guarantees which would have protected them from exposure to a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of that provision in this regard.
VG München / Az.: M 17 K 16.34416 / Ungarn
2. Demnach kann im vorliegenden Fall von einem zielstaatsbezogenen Abschiebehindernis ausgegangen werden.
2.1. Die Klägerseite hat psychotherapeutische Stellungnahmen […] vorgelegt, wonach bei der Klägerin zu 2. eine mittelgradige depressive Episode und posttraummatische Belastungsstörung diagnostiziert wurden. Sie habe massive Kopfschmerzen, hohen Blutdruck, Angstzustände, innere Unruhe, Schlafstörungen und Albträume und sei nicht reisefähig. Es sei davon auszugehen, dass sie in Ungarn keine Psychotherapie in ihrer Muttersprache erhalten werde und eine rein medikamentöse Behandlung werde nicht ausreichen. Muttersprache sei jedoch unverzichtbare Voraussetzung für die Durchführung einer Psychotherapie und eine Unterbrechung der Behandlung werde eine signifikante Verschlechterung ihres psychischen und physischen Zustands zur Folge haben. Eine Selbstgefährdung mit suizidaler Absicht sei nicht auszuschließen. Zudem wurde ein Attest […] übermittelt, wonach bei der Klägerin zu 2. eine posttraumatische Belastungsreaktion und ein schwer einstellbarer arterieller Hypertonus vorlägen. Sie leide sehr unter der drohenden Abschiebung, was sich u.a. in einer Verschlechterung ihrer Psyche und in hyperintensiven Blutdruckkrisen wiederspiegle. Eine Unterbrechung der psychiatrischen Begleitung könne zu einer Major Depression führen, die Klägerin wäre eventuell nicht mehr in der Lage, ihre Kinder zu versorgen. Ohne Einnahme der Blutdruckmedikamente könne dies zu Blutdruckkrisen führen, die zu Schlaganfällen, Herzinfarkten und irreversiblen Langzeitschäden im Herz-Kreislaufsystem führen könnten.
2.2. Es ist davon auszugehen, dass die Kläger bei einer Rückkehr nach Ungarn obdachlos wären und die Klägerin zu 2. in absehbarer Zeit weder psychiatrische noch die erforderliche internistische Behandlung erhalten würde.
a) Zwar genießen Asylsuchende, anerkannte Flüchtlinge und unter subsidiärem Schutz Stehende in Ungarn grundsätzlich freie Gesundheitsführsorge, Rehabilitation, psychische Behandlung und Psychotherapie und zwar im gleichen Maße wie ungarische Staatsangehörige, soweit der Bedarf von einem Mediziner festgestellt wird. In den offenen und geschlossenen Aufnahmeeinrichtungen wird die ärztliche Grundversorgung durch Ärzte und Medikamente sichergestellt. In schwerwiegenden Fällen, in denen die Behandlung vor Ort nicht ausreichend ist, kann die Zuweisung in die Allgemein- oder Spezialeinrichtungen des ungarischen Gesundheitssystems durch den behandelnden Arzt erfolgen, wenn er dies aus medizinischen Gründen für notwendig erachtet. Die Kosten der Behandlung tragen in diesen Fällen der ungarische Staat bzw. seine Gesundheitseinrichtungen. In einigen Aufnahmeeinrichtungen wird zudem psychologische Betreuung durch Spezialisten und Psychologen der Cordelia Stiftung gewährt […].
b) Das Gericht ist aber davon überzeugt, dass es den Klägern in ihrer besonderen Situation faktisch nicht gelingen wird, in Ungarn Arbeit, Wohnraum und/oder medizinische Behandlung erhalten. Die Kläger, die mittellos sind, haben in der mündlichen Verhandlung nachvollziehbar geschildert, dass sie in Ungarn keinerlei staatliche Unterstützung erhalten haben und ihnen niemand Wohnraum zur Verfügung stellen bzw. Arbeit geben wollte. Bestätigt wird diese Schilderung durch den Umstand, dass Ungarn durch Gesetzesänderungen vom 1. April 2016 und 1. Juni 2016 sämtliche Unterstützungsleistungen für anerkannte Asylbewerber, Flüchtlinge und subsidiär Schutzberechtigte eingestellt hat […]. Laut Helsinki Komitee […] drohen diesen damit Obdachlosigkeit und Verelendung. Die Mieten in Ungarn seien für den genannten Personenkreis zu hoch und Vermieter überließen ihren Wohnraum lieber an Ungarn. Entsprechendes gelte für Arbeitgeber, zumal die ungarische Sprache insoweit ein großes Hindernis für eine Anstellung sei […]. Es ist daher nicht davon auszugehen, dass die Kläger Arbeit und eine Wohnung auf dem freien Wohnungsmarkt finden können, zumal sie in Ungarn über keine finanzielle Unterstützung durch Angehörige oder Freunde verfügen […]. Den Klägern zu 1. und 2. und ihren drei kleinen Kindern (2 1/2, 5 und 6 Jahre alt) ist es nicht zumutbar, auf der Straße zu leben. Zudem ist der Erhalt einer Gesundheitskarte in Ungarn von einer Adresskarte abhängig, die in der Praxis, insbesondere bei Betroffenen ohne festen Wohnsitz, mit vielen, allenfalls erschwert überwindbaren Hürden verbunden ist […]. Nach den vorliegenden Attesten wird sich aber der psychische und physische Gesundheitszustand der Klägerin zu 2. ohne die erforderliche Behandlung alsbald signifikant verschlechtern und es drohen schwerwiegende Erkrankungen wie Schlaganfall, Herzinfarkt und irreversible Schäden am Herz-Kreislaufsystem. Damit ist aber eine erhebliche und konkrete Gefahr im Sinne der o.g. Rechtsprechung und damit ein zielstaatsbezogenes Abschiebungshindernis gemäß § 60 Abs. 7 AufenthG zu bejahen.
Nach alledem war der Klage daher hinsichtlich der Feststellung eines Abschiebungsverbots gemäß § 60 Abs. 7 Satz 1 AufenthG stattzugeben (Nr. 4 des streitgegenständlichen Bescheids). Dementsprechend waren auch die Abschiebungsanordnung sowie das Einreise- und Aufenthaltsverbot aufzuheben (Nrn. 5 und 6 des Bescheids).
Stellungnahme des HHC: Hungary – Government’s New Asylum Bill on Collective Push-backs and Automatic Detention
The most concerning changes include:
- The grounds on which the Government may order a ‘state of crisis due to mass migration’ are extended to include vaguely defined requirements [Bill, Article 6].
- The Government plans to extend the existing state of crisis by a further 6 months, it has announced, until 7 September 2017.
- If any foreigner who has no right to stay in Hungary is apprehended anywhere in the country, s/he shall be “escorted” back by the police to the external side of the border fence along the southern border. Migrants affected by this push-back measure will not be given access to seek asylum or to challenge their removal from the country, an action that makes the otherwise prohibited collective expulsion the norm, and breaches the EU Returns Directive. No registration or individual documentation of persons “escorted” back across the fence is carried out, neither are their protection needs assessed [Bill, Article 7].
- Asylum applications can only be submitted in person within the transit zones [Bill, Article 7]. This proposal is especially problematic and worrying as since 23 January 2017 the number of admitted asylum seekers to each of the now operational two transit zones along the Serbian border has been reduced to 5-5 persons per working day.
- All those who are accomodated at open reception facilities or detained in asylum or immigration detention facilities at the time the bill enters into force will be transferred to the transit zones [Bill, Articles 3, 4 and 9].
- All asylum-seekers, including all vulnerable persons and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children over 14 years of age, will be detained in the transit zones [Bill, Articles 4, 7 and 9]. The detention of unaccompanied minor children between the age of 14-18 years is clearly against the best interest of the child and breaches human rights and EU law.
- The placement of asylum-seekers in the transit zones is “effectively detention”, as even the Government admits it in the reasoning of the Bill [General reasoning, para. 4]. However, no detention order would be issued and consequently no legal remedy would be available against the detention. The current maximum 28 days of stay in the transit zone would be eliminated, rendering the de facto detention of asylum seekers indefinite [Bill, Article 12].
- The deadline to seek judicial review of inadmissibility decisions and rejections of asylum applications would be drastically shortened to 3 days, hindering the applicant’s ability to challenge these decisions in court [Bill, Article 7].
- Judicial clerks, who are not appointed fully qualified judges, would also be involved in making court decisions in the asylum procedure [Bill, Article 6].
- Personal interviews in the judicial review of asylum decisions could be carried out remotely via telecommunication devices [Bill, Article 6].
- Asylum seekers in the transit zones would be obliged to cover the costs of their detention unless they are granted protection status [Bill, Article 3].
VG Hannover / AZ.: 7B 387 / 17 / Bulgarien
[…] Darüber hinaus hat der Einzelrichter der 6. Kammer des VG Hannover mit Urteil vom 11.11.2016 – 6 A 6144/15 – (Entscheidungsabdruck S. 4ff.) aktuell ausgeführt:[
„Nach Auffassung des Gerichts gibt es im Sinne von Art 3 Abs. 2 Dublin-III-VO wesentliche Gründe für die Annahme systemischer Schwachstellen hinsichtlich der Asylverfahren und der Aufnahmebedingungen für Antragssteller in Bulgarien, die eine Gefahr einer unmenschlichen oder entwürdigenden Behandlung im Sinne von Art. 4 GR-Charta mit sich bringen.
Eine systematisch begründete, ernsthafte Gefahr einer unmenschlichen oder erniedrigenden Behandlung im Sinne von Art. 4 GR-Charta liegt vor, wenn mit Blick auf das Gewicht und Ausmaß einer drohenden Beeinträchtigung dieses Grundrechts mit einem beachtlichen Grad von Wahrscheinlichkeit eine reale, nämlich nämlich durch eine hinreichend gesicherte Tatsachengrundlage belegte Gefahr besteht, dass dem Betroffenen in dem Mitgliedsstaat, in den er überstellt werden soll, entweder schon der Zugang zu einem Asylverfahren, welches nicht mit grundlegenden Mängeln behaftet ist, verwehrt oder massiv erschwert wird, das Asylverfahren an grundlegenden Mängeln leidet oder dass er während der Dauer des Asylverfahrens wegen einer grundlegend defizitären Ausstattung mit den notwendigen Mitteln elementare Grundbedürfnisse des Menschen (wie z.B. Unterkunft, Nahrungsaufnahme und Hygienebedürfnisse) nicht in einer noch zumutbaren Weise befriedigen kann (vgl. OVG NRW, Urteil vom 7. März 2014 – 1 A 21/12.A -, juris). Sind in diesem Zusammenhang bestimmte Anforderungen in EU-Richtlinien festgelegt worden, kann sich (konkretisierend) auch daraus der im Sinne der angesprochenen Artikel für ein menschenwürdiges Dasein einzuhaltende Maßsstab ergeben, soweit es sich dabei erkennbar um Mindestanforderungen handelt. Hieran muss sich dann nicht nur der Inhalt nationaler Rechtsvorschriften, sondern auch und gerade die praktische Umsetzung messen lassen (vgl. OVG NRW, a.a.O.).
Hinzukommen muss immer, dass der konkrete Schutzsuchende auch individuell betroffen wäre. Es genügt nicht, dass lediglich abstrakt bestimmte Schwachstellen festgestellt werden können, wenn sich diese nicht auf den Antragssteller auswirken können (VGH Mannheim, Urteil vom 1. April 2015 – A 11 S 106/15 -, juris).
Nach diesem Maßsstab ist gegenwärtig aufgrund der dem Gericht zugrunde liegenden Erkenntnismittel von systemischen Mängeln im Asylsystem Bulgarien auszugehen. Denn die Kamer geht davon aus, dass in Bulgarien derzeit die reale Gefahr besteht, dass der Kläger in seinem subjektiven Recht auf Sachprüfung seines Asylantrags nach Art. 18 Abs. 2 und Art. 3 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Dublin-III-VO verletzt wird und dadurch die Geltendmachung seines Asylrechts vereitelt wird. […]
Neuer AIDA-Bericht zu Ungarn
Zusammenfassung des Berichts:
In the O.M. v. Hungary judgment of 5 October 2016, the ECtHR found that detention was not assessed in a sufficiently individ ualised manner and that the authorities did not exercise particular care in order to avoid situations facing an asylum seeker on account of his sexual orientation, which risked reproducing the plight that forced him to flee. Further on, detention for the purpose of establishing the asylum seeker’s identity does not fall under the scope of Article 5(1)(b) of ECHR, when asylum seeker makes reasonable efforts to clear his/her identity, because there is no legal obligation for asylum seekers in Hungary to provide documentary evidence of their identity.
Integration support: As a result of legislative changes in April and June 2016, all forms of integration support were eliminated. Since the entry into effect of Decrees 113/2016 and 62/2016 and the June 2016 amendment to the Asylum Act, beneficiaries of international protection are no longer eligible to any state support such as housing support, additional assistance and others.
There is no specific code of conduct for interpreters in the context of asylum procedures. Many interpreters are not professionally trained on asylum issues. There is no quality assessment performed on their work, nor are thereany requirements in order to become an interpreter forthe IAO. The IAO is obliged to select the cheapest interpret from the list, even though his quality would not be the best.For example, in the Vámosszabadi refugee camp, the HHC lawyer reported that in all his cases regarding Nigerian clients, none of the English interpreters understood fully what the clients said; the lawyer had to help the interpreter. The same happened at the court. There was another case, where the interpreter did not speak English well enough to be able to translate; for example, he did not know the word„asylum“. In another case before the Budapest court, the interpreter was from Djibouti, and the client from Somalia did not understand her. The interpreter said the client was lying and the judge decided that there would be no interview.In another case the client claimed that he converted to Christianity and the interpreter was Muslim. He did not know the expressions needed for the interview, not even in Farsi,not to mention Hungarian; for example: disciples, Easter, Christmas and so on. The lawyer had to help him.
A decision must be communicated orally to the person seeking asylum in his or her mother tongue or in another language he or she understands. Together with this oral communication, the decision shall alsobe made available to the applicant in writing, but only in Hungarian. The HHC’s attorneys working at the transit zones and Kiskunhalas observe that most of decisions are not translated to the clients by interpreters. Instead the IAO uses case officers or even other clients to announce the main points of the decision. The justification for a decision reached is never explained to the asylum seeker.The following situations are applicable to Dublin returnees:
(a) Persons who had not previously applied in Hungary and persons whose applications are still pending are both treated as first-time asylum applicants.
(b) For persons whose applications are considered to have been tacitly withdrawn (i.e. they left Hungary and moved on to another EU Member State) and the asylum procedure had been terminated, the asylum procedure may be continued if the person requests such a continuation within 9 months of the withdrawal of the original application. Where that time-limit has expired, the person is considered to be a subsequent applicant (see section on Subsequent Applications). However, imposing a deadline in order for the procedure to be continued is contrary to the Dublin III Regulation, as the second paragraph of Article 18(2) states that when the Member State responsible had discontinued the examination of an application following its withdrawal by the applicant before a decision on the substance has been taken at first instance, that Member State shall ensure that the applicant is entitled to request that the examination of his or her application be completed or to lodge a new application for international protection, which shall not be treated as a subsequent application as provided for in the recast Asylum Procedures Directive. This is also recalled in Article 28(3) of the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive, which explicitly provides that the aforementioned 9-month rule on withdrawn applications “shall be without prejudice to [the Dublin III Regulation].”
(c) Persons who withdraw their application in writing cannot request the continuation of their asylum procedure upon return to Hungary; therefore they will have to submit a subsequent application and present new facts or circumstances (see section on Subsequent Applications). This is also
not in line with above-described second paragraph of Article 18(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, which should be applied also in cases of explicit withdrawal in writing and not only in cases of tacit withdrawal. This is problematic in the view of recent practices in Hungary when detained asylum seekers withdraw their applications in order to be released from asylum detention. By imposing detention on asylum seekers returned under the Dublin III Regulation, in practice the IAO promotes the option of withdrawal amongst them. This practice can be interpreted as a disciplinary use of detention against those who lodge an asylum claim in Hungary.
(d) The asylum procedure would also not continue, when the returned foreigner had previously received a negative decision and did not seek judicial review. This is problematic when the IAO issued a decision in someone’s absence. The asylum seeker who is later returned under the Dublin procedure to Hungary will have to submit a subsequent application and present new facts and evidence in support of the application (see section on Subsequent Applications). According to Article 18(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, the responsible Member State that takes back the applicant whose applicat
ion has been rejected only at the first instance shall ensure that the applicant has or has had the opportunity to seek an effective remedy against the rejection. According to the IAO, the applicant only has a right to request a judicial review in case the decision has not yet become legally binding. Since a decision rejecting the application becomes binding once the deadline for seeking judicial review has passed without such a request being submitted, the HHC believes that the Hungarian practice is in breach of the Dublin III Regulation because in such cases Dublin returnee applicants are not afforded an opportunity to seek judicial review after their return to Hungary.
Especially problematic will be the case of returned asylum seekers who have crossed Serbia before arriving in Hungary. In case they will have to submit a subsequent application, their application will be likely declared inadmissible based on an application of the “safe third country” notion, without the possibility for these persons to be heard beforehand. Since there is no effective remedy against the unlawful decision of the IAO, such transfers to Hungary are exposing applicants to a real risk of chain deportation to Serbia, which may trigger a practice of indirect refoulement.Since the enactment of legislative amendments to the Asylum Act in 2015 and ensuing practice, administrative authorities and courts in at least 15 countries have ruled against Dublin transfers to Hungary. At least 6 countries (Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, United Kingdom) have suspended transfers to Hungary as a matter of policy.
The fact is that since 15 September 2015, Serbia is not taking back third-country nationals under the readmission agreement except for those who hold valid travel/identity documents and are exempted from Serbian visa requirements. Therefore actual returns to Serbia are not possible. Between January and November 2016, only 182 irregular migrants were officially returned to Serbia. Neither the refusal of the asylum applications in the transit zones, nor the “legalised” push-backs since 5 July 2016 result in such official readmissions. Among the readmitted persons, there were 84 Serbian, 35 Kosovar and 27 Albanian citizens. None of the returnees were Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi or Somali citizens. Despite this fact, the IAO still issues inadmissiblity decisions based on safe third country grounds.
Where the safe third country fails to take back the applicant, the refugee authority shall withdraw its decision and continue the procedure. This provision is not respected in practice. Even though it is clear that Serbia will not accept back asylum seekers from Hungary, the IAO does not automaticaly withdraw the inadmissiblity decision, but the person needs to apply for asylum again. According to the HHC’s experience asylum seekers have to go through the admissibility assessment for two or even three times and only after submitting the third or fourth asylum application would their case not be declared inadmissible. This results in extremely lenghty procedures which leave people in great depair. Sometimes asylum seekers would be even detained after receiving a final rejection based on Serbia being a safe third country, despite the fact that deportations to Serbia are not taking place.
A request for judicial review against the IAO decision declaring an application inadmissible has no suspensive effect, except for judicial review regarding inadmissible applications based on safe third country grounds. The court may not alter the decision of the refugee authority; it shall annul any administrative decision found to be against the law, with the exception of the breach of a procedural rule not affecting the merits of the case, and it shall oblige the refugee authority to conduct a new procedure.
In practice, asylum seekers may face obstacles to lodging a request for judicial review against inadmissibility decisions for the following reasons:
– The 7-day deadline for applying for judicial review appears to be too short for an applicant to be able to benefit from qualified and professional legal assistance, and does not appear to satisfy the requirements of Article 13 ECHR on the right to an effective remedy. Without a functioning and professional legal aid system available for asylum seekers, the vast majority of them have no access to legal assistance when they receive a negative decision from the IAO. Many asylum seekers may fail to understand the reasons for the rejection, especially in case of complicated legal arguments, such as the safe third country concept, and also lack awareness about their right to turn to court. The excessively short deadline makes it difficult for the asylum seeker to exercise her or his right to an effective remedy.
– The procedure is in Hungarian and the decision on inadmissibility is only translated once i.e. upon its communication to the applicant, in his or her mother tongue or in a language that the applicant may reasonably understand. This prevents the asylum seeker from having a copy of his or her own decision in a language he or she understands so that later he or she could recall the specific reasons why the claim was found inadmissible. The judge has to take a decision in 8 days on a judicial review request. The 8-day deadline for the judge to deliver a decision is insufficient for “a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law” as prescribed by EU law. Five or six working days are not enough for a judge to obtain crucial evidence (such as digested and translated country information, or a medical/psychological expert opinion) or to arrange a personal hearing with a suitable interpreter.
– The lack of an automatic suspensive effect on removal measures is in violation of the principle established in the consistent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which this is an indispensable condition for a remedy to be considered effective in removal cases. While rules under EU asylum law are more permissive in this respect and allow for the lack of an automatic suspensive effect in case of inadmissibility decisions and accelerated procedures, the lack of an automatic suspensive effect may still raise compatibility issues with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The lack of an automatic suspensive effect is in clear violation of EU law with regard to standard procedures, as the Asylum Procedures Directive allows for this option only in certain specific (for example accelerated) procedures. In all cases where the suspensive effect is not automatic, it is difficult to imagine how an asylum seeker will be able to submit a request for the suspension of her/his removal as she/he is typically without professional legal assistance and subject to an unreasonably short deadline to lodge the request. To make it even worse for asylum seekers, the rules allowing for a request to grant a suspensive effect to be submitted are not found in the Asylum Act itself, but they emanate from general rules concerning civil court procedures. The amended Asylum Act lacks any additional safeguards for applicants in need of
special procedural guarantees with regard to the automatic suspensive effect, although this is clearly required by EU law.
– Finally, asylum seekers often lack basic skills and do not understand the decision and the procedure to effectively represent their own case before the court, which only carries out a non-litigious procedure based on the files of the case and where an oral hearing is rather exceptional. Applicants are not informed that they have to specifically request a hearing in their appeal. The unreasonably short time limit and the lack of a personal hearing may reduce the judicial review to a mere formality, in which the judge has no other information than the documents provided by the IAO.The European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Hungary for the violation of asylum-related EU law in December 2015, after a record fast preparatory process. Regarding the asylum procedure, the Commission is concerned that there is no possibility to refer to new facts and circumstances in the context of appeals and that Hungary is not automatically suspending decisions in case of appeals, effectively forcing applicants to leave their territory before the time limit for lodging an appeal expires, or before an appeal has been heard. Further on, the Commission is also concerned as to the fact that, under the new Hungarian law dealing with the judicial review of decisions rejecting an asylum application, a personal hearing of the applicants is optional. Judicial decisions taken by court secretaries (a sub-judicial level) lacking judicial independence also seem to be in breach of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive and Article 47 of the Charter. The infringement procedure is still not closed.
A subsequent application is considered as an application following a final termination or rejection decision on the former application. New circumstances or facts have to be submitted in order for a subsequent application to be admissible. For persons whose applications are considered to have been tacitly withdrawn (i.e. they left Hungary and moved on to another EU
Member State) and the asylum procedure had been terminated, the asylum procedure may be continued if the person requests such a continuation within 9 months of the withdrawal of the original application. Where that time-limit has expired, the person is considered to be a subsequent applicant. Persons who withdraw their application in writing cannot request the continuation of their asylum procedure upon return to Hungary; therefore they will have to submit a subsequent application and present new facts or circumstances.According to the HHC, detention of asylum seekers in Hungary often does not comply with the requirements of ECHR. Asylum seekers in detention in Hungary receive a humanitarian permit while they are in detention, which means that they are explicitly authorised to stay in Hungary during the asylum procedure. Since this is the case, their detention cannot fall under the Article 5(1)(f) of the Convention, because their detention does not pursue the two purposes mentioned in this provision, namely detention for the purpose of deportation and detention in order to prevent unauthorised entry. Further on, detention for the purpose of establishing their identity also cannot fall under Article 5(1)(b) of the Convention since, under current legislation in Hungary, there is no obligation for asylum seekers to provide documentary evidence of their identity. Therefore detention for the purpose of establishing their identity is unlawful, when asylum seekers make reasonable efforts to clear their identity. All the above is reflected in the O.M. v. Hungary judgment of the ECtHR that became final on 5 October 2016. The judgment also finds that detention was not assessed in a sufficiently individualised manner and that in case of the applicant, who belonged to a vulnerable group, the authorities did not exercise particular care in order to avoid situations which may reproduce the plight that forced him to flee.
In Békéscsaba and Nyírbátor, when escorted from the facility to court for hearings, or on other outings (such as to visit a hospital, bank or post office), detained asylum seekers are handcuffed and escorted on leashes, which are normally used for the accused in criminal proceedings.
Recognised refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection can stay in the reception centre for 30 days more after their recognition.
NGOs and social workers have reported extreme difficulties for refugees moving out of reception centres and integrating into local communities in practice. Accommodation free of charge
is provided exclusively by civil society organisations and churches. They run homes mostly in Budapest yet the number of places provided is not sufficient. As a result of the lack of places, many of the beneficiaries of international protection are forced to rent apartments or to become homeless. Due to the lack of apartments on the market, the rental fees are too high to be affordable for beneficiaries who have just been granted status. In addition to these difficulties, landlords prefer to let their apartments to Hungarian rather than foreign citizens.
VG Magdeburg / Az.: 5 B 591/16 MD / Ungarn
Nachdem die Kammer noch mit Urteil vom 03.09.2015 (Az. 5 A2 107 90/15 MD) davon ausgegangen ist, dass in Ungarn systemische Mängel im Asylverfahren nicht bestehen, so kann nunmehr aufgrund neuerer Erkenntnismittel sowie obergerichtlicher Rechtsprechung diese Annahme nicht ohne weitere Sachverhaltsaufklärung getroffen werden. Es sind Anhaltspunkte dafür ersichtlich, dass in Ungarn möglicherweise mit systemischen Mängeln des Asylverfahrens zu rechnen ist und ein Asylbewerber Gefahr läuft, mindestens einer erniedrigenden Behandlung ausgesetzt zu werden. So hat er Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württenberg in seinem Urteil vom 13.10.2016 (Az. A 11 S 1596/16, zitiert nach juris) dazu ausgeführt:
„Auch zum heutigen Zeitpunkt ist nach wie vor von einer hohen Inhaftierungsquote auszugehen. Amnesty international teilt unter Berufung auf das Hungary Helsinki Commitee mit, dass zum 01.08.2016 noch etwa 1200 registrierte Flüchtlinge in Ungarn geblieben seien, von denen etwa 700 inhaftiert gewesen seien […].
Diese Quoten begründen nach Überzeugung des Senats in Anbetracht der erheblichen und einschneidenden Folgen einer Inhaftierung für die Betroffenen die erforderliche beachtliche Wahrscheinlichkeit im Sinne eines „real risk“. Ausgehend von diesen Zahlen muss der Kläger dann, wenn er nach Ungarn zurückkehren würde, um dort ein (weiteres) Verfahren auf Gewährung internationalen Schutzes durchzuführen, als alleinstehender Mann mit beachtlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit damit rechnen in Haft zu kommen. Das nach den verwerteten Erkenntnismitteln hoch defizitäre Haftanordnungs- bzw. Haftprüfungsverfahren, das die Betroffenen einer willkürlichen Behandlung aussetzt, und in dem sie in der Regel nicht einmal im Ansatz in ihrer Subjektqualität wahrgenommen werden, verstößt nicht nur gegen die menschenrechtlichen Garantien der Art. 5 und Art. 13 EMRK (vgl. zu dem Aspekt der mangelnden Eröffnung der maßgeblichen Gründe einer Inhaftierung und einer hieraus folgenden Verletzung von Art. 3 EMRK EGMR, Urteil vom 01.09.2015 – Nr. 16483/12, Khlaifia u.a./Italien -, juris; vom. 05.07.2016 – Nr. 9912/15), sondern auch – jedenfalls in Zusammenschau mit den konkreten Haftbedingungen bei desolater Unterbringungssituation und den Handlungsweisen des Personals mit systematischer Schlechtbehandlung – gegen Art. 3 EMRK und damit gegen Art. 4 GRCh. Es ist nach alledem davon auszugehen, dass angesichts der schweren Mängel des Haftanordnungsverfahrens der Kläger keine effektive und faire Chance haben wird, seine Belange in das Verfahren einzubringen und damit gehört zu werden, weshalb es dem Kläger nicht zugemutet werden konnte, in Ungarn ein (weiteres) Verfahren auf internationalen Schutz durchzuführen, mit der Folge, dass mit der Asylantragstellung im Bundesgebiet die Zuständigkeit der Bundesrepublik begründet wurde.
[…]
2. Die dargestellte Problematik hat jedoch auch weitergehende Folgen und berührt- ungeachtet der Aufürhungen unter I – die Rechtmäßigkeit der Ziffer 1, in der der Asylantrag als unzulässig abgelehnt worden war.
[…]
Zu demselben Ergebnis gelangt auch das OVG Lüneburg in seiner Entscheidung vom 15.11.2016 (Az. LB 92/15, zitiert nach juris) und bejaht ebenfalls das Vorliegen systemischer Mängel in Ungarn hinsichtlich der dortigen Inhaftierungspraxis von Dublin-Rückkehrern, einer Abschiebung nach Serbien ohne inhaltliche Prüfung der Asylanträge von Dublin-Rückkehrern sowie der nicht bestehenden realistischen Möglichkeit von Überstellungen nach Ungarn innerhalb von sechs Monaten nach Rechtskraft der Entscheidung.